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RESPONSE COMMENTARY
Holistic and Leadership Approaches to
International Regulation: Confronting Nature
Conservation and Developmental Challenges.
A Reply to Farnese
Stuart Harrop*
Abstract
International nature protection law has developed without a coherent plan, with disparate
governance instruments each largely evolving within their own separate sphere. Yet, many
other issues are closely linked to the challenges of nature degradation, such as developmental
challenges, climate change, food security and food safety, disease prevention, and rural
poverty. These interconnections have partly been recognized in Agenda 21 and more recently
in the Aichi Biodiversity Targets. This response commentary draws on and extrapolates
further the conclusions of Patricia Farnese in ‘The Prevention Imperative’, published in this
issue of Transnational Environmental Law, and argues for a more coherent approach and
effective leadership in this area of global regulation, along with a more ﬂexible and holistic
approach to governance responses.
Keywords: Nature Protection, Development, Health and Disease Prevention, Climate
Change, Global Integration and Leadership, Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
1. introduction
The article entitled ‘The Prevention Imperative: InternationalHealth and Environmental
Governance Responses to Emerging Zoonotic Diseases’, written by Patricia Farnese
and published in this issue of Transnational Environmental Law,1 focuses on the links
between zoonotic disease vectors and wildlife conservation. It argues in favour of the
need to coordinate wildlife protection and zoosanitary regimes in international law
and proposes to link them into a coordinated portfolio of international instruments.
This is a welcome proposition. While, understandably, Farnese’s scope was deliberately
* University of Sussex, School of Law, Politics and Sociology, Brighton, Sussex (United Kingdom) (UK).
Email: S.Harrop@sussex.ac.uk.
1 P.L. Farnese, ‘The Prevention Imperative: International Health and Environmental Governance
Responses to Emerging Zoonotic Diseases’ (2014) 3(2)Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 285–309.
constrained, I propose, without in the least criticizing the author, that the general
principles set out be taken much further. The main argument of ‘The Prevention
Imperative’ can be summarized as follows: ‘there can be no doubt that human alteration
of the natural world is the primary cause of disease emergence’2; ‘. states are not
required to evaluate the health impact of land-use decisions’,3 and ‘global efforts to
protect wild spaces are rarely identiﬁed as a health imperative’.4 On this basis, we
may contend that ‘health’ embraces issues that are wider than those that may normally
be considered as health issues per se, such as food and water security, food safety,
poverty and lack of access to fundamental natural resources. As a result, land use,
agricultural strategies, nature conservation, human well-being, along with the health
of human communities are all so inextricably connected that any international
strategy to deal with them must be a combined and highly prioritized effort.
Unfortunately, this suggestion has not generated any serious traction within the
international community. Global coordination over international issues can sometimes
be achieved, for instance, over the arguably less essential issue of liberalization of
global trade. Indeed, politicians, naturally preoccupied with economic growth,
welcomed the creation of a World Trade Organization (WTO) and states were
particularly eager to join the newly established regime.5 On the other hand, the
fundamental issue of ‘environmental health’ creates considerably less enthusiasm,
and ratiﬁcation of international texts on the matter is often met with resistance.
Moreover, signiﬁcant global players often prove reluctant to approve even the most
permissive and watered down versions of legal documents that concern global health
issues.6
Farnese iterates a number of key points on the connections between health and
conservation that mirror other dialogues linking conservation practices with wider
issues such as food security or climate change mitigation. She indicates that good
conservation practices contribute to disease prevention. I would add that these
practices also function as climate change controls and contribute to building
sustainable agricultural strategies by facilitating low pesticide use while preventing crop
diseases.7 Farnese also refers to the dangers of habitat fragmentation which can disrupt
‘natural predator and prey relationships that are important in keeping infectious diseases
under control’.8 It is important to note that habitat fragmentation can also disrupt
coherent ecosystems on a wider scale: it can remove the buffers that moderate the
impact of climate change and ensure that biodiverse ecosystems remain intact when
2 Ibid., at p. 287.
3 Ibid., at p. 285.
4 Ibid., at p. 286.
5 P. Lamy, ‘The Place of the WTO and Its Law in the International Legal Order’ (2006) 17(5) European
Journal of International Law, pp. 969–84.
6 See generally S.R. Harrop, ‘“Living In Harmony with Nature”? Outcomes of the 2010 Nagoya
Conference of the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (2011) 23(1) Journal of Environmental Law,
pp. 117–28.
7 J. Lu & X. Li, ‘Review of Rice-Fish-Farming Systems in China: One of the Globally Important Ingenious
Agricultural Heritage Systems (GIAHS)’ (2006) 260(1–4) Aquaculture, pp. 106–13.
8 Farnese, n. 1 above, at p. 287.
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faced with dramatic, rapid and damaging change.9 I therefore suggest that the
arguments put forward by Farnese could be applied more broadly to nature
conservation law and related areas of regulation.
International law dealing with natural resource protection has grown incrementally
and somewhat chaotically, often across international agencies with substantially
differing agendas, without any attempt at coordination except in hindsight. Thus,
there is no body yet established which is unequivocally responsible for their development
and implementation of this fragmented and disjointed body of law. The fact that
nature conservation is a global concern and is probably only effectively achievable
through coordinated international action makes the current situation all the more
problematic. In addition, natural resource conservation is not only inextricably
linked to human health with regard to disease prevention (as already mentioned),
but it also relates directly to agricultural strategies, food security and food safety.
Natural resource conservation should therefore ﬁnd a place at the top of the agenda
of the lawmaking processes of the international community. Arguably, such
anthropocentric considerations should not be needed to justify the protection of
the biosphere, but in reality few politicians are concerned with deep ecological
ideals that may only bear fruit long after their terms of ofﬁce have expired.10
Indeed, action taken now to reverse the relentless trend of biodiversity destruction
may seem abstract today and may only manifest demonstrable and beneﬁcial
results in the long term. However, immediate food security, food safety and animal
health issues must surely be more attractive issues for politicians to tackle. Thus, should
advocates of wildlife and nature protection embrace this wider perspective, they might
see useful results in their attempts to strengthen international nature protection law.
2. unconnected regimes of international law
The regime of international instruments dealing with environmental protection has
evolved without structure, strategy or overall coordination. Indeed, international
environmental instruments rarely cross-reference each other, hardly ever use consistent
terminology or otherwise relate to each other.11 For example, the Convention on the
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS Convention)12 and
the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats
(Bern Convention)13 concern overlapping subjects. Because of their focus on protecting
endangered and threatened species and habitats, they could have deployed parallel and
similar legal approaches. However, they use different legal language and regulatory
9 J.M.J. Travis, ‘Climate Change andHabitat Destruction: ADeadly Anthropogenic Cocktail’ (2003) 270
(1514) Proceedings of the Royal Society, pp. 467–73.
10 See S.R.Harrop&D.J. Pritchard, ‘AHard Instrument Goes Soft: The Implications of the Convention on
Biological Diversity’s Current Trajectory’ (2011) 21 Global Environmental Change, pp. 474–80.
11 Ibid.
12 Bonn (Germany), 23 June 1979, in force 1 Nov. 1983, available at: http://www.cms.int/en/node/3916.
13 Bern (Switzerland), 19 Sept. 1979, in force 1 June 1982, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/
cultureheritage/nature/bern/default_en.asp.
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approaches; they do not seek to mirror each other even when dealing with relatively
straightforward issues, such as exceptions to prohibitions on killing or taking wild
animals.
On a wider scale, nature conservation issues did not receive priority in pre-1992
instruments and have evolved haphazardly for a variety of reasons. The International
Whaling Commission (IWC)14 deals exclusively with cetacean species.15 There are no
parallel institutional frameworks to govern the protection of other, arguably more
important marine species. This is not surprising since the IWC was not established to
deal with what now would be understood as ‘ecological challenges’, but instead to
maintain the orderly development of the whaling industry. Consequently, the IWCwas
not originally designed to function from a conservation perspective, as would be
commonly understood today, but has rather adapted to current perspectives.16
The fundamental approach to regulation within international nature conservation
instruments is also widely inconsistent. The Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)17 contains technical and
detailed legal provisions that are capable of being transmuted into national law by
state parties with relative ease and consistency despite the inherent differences in
national contexts. However, other instruments such as the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD)18 are drafted in such a vague manner that states can justify their
inaction by interpreting the terms of the instrument in away that suits them.19 In contrast
with CITES, the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as
Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar)20 comprises simple, broad and often weak terms with
generally drafted provisions and limited obligations. For example, Ramsar only requires
states to substantially protect one wetland (Article 2(4)) and Member States are
permitted to delete that site from the list and substitute another (Article 4(2)), a principle
which surely contradicts the principle of wise use enunciated in Article 3(1) of
the Convention.
The subject-matter of many instruments also overlap and may even appear to
compete. For instance, some protected areas around the world are simultaneously
covered by the UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural
and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention or WHC),21 the Ramsar, Bern, and
14 Established by the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), Washington,
DC (US), 2 Dec. 1946, in force 10 Nov. 1948, available at: http://iwc.int/convention.
15 S. Stephenson, A. Mooers & A. Attaran, ‘Does Size Matter? The ICRW and the Inclusion of Small
Cetaceans’ (2014) 3(2) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 241–63.
16 S.R. Harrop, ‘From Cartel to Conservation and on to Compassion: Animal Welfare and the
International Whaling Commission’ (2003) 6 Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy,
pp. 79–104.
17 Washington,DC (US), 3Mar. 1973, in force 1 July 1975, available at: http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.php.
18 Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 22May 1992, in force 29 Dec. 1993, available at: http://www.cbd.int/convention/
text/default.shtml.
19 For an analysis of the CBD in this context, see Harrop & Pritchard, n. 10 above.
20 Ramsar (Iran), 2 Feb. 1971, in force 21 Dec. 1975, available at: http://www.ramsar.org.
21 Paris (France), 16 Nov. 1972, in force 17 Dec. 1975, available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext.
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Bonn Conventions, and the UNESCOMan and Biosphere Programme.22 The varied list
of colourful logos brings to mind non-governmental organizations (NGOs) vying for
business rather than international legal instruments fulﬁlling their obligations.
In 1992, the Rio Earth Summit23 began a process that had the potential to provide
solutions for the limitations highlighted above. Indeed, the principal soft law instrument
to derive from that summit, Agenda 21, emphasized the need to deal with many of the
disparate issues that face the international community. Even today, the document could
provide a reasonable blueprint to begin a process to build a uniﬁed global approach to
tackle the immense and pressing environmental and developmental challenges that we
face and that question our current life choices. The chapters of Agenda 21 deal with
a variety of issues, including poverty, human health, protection of the biosphere from
different perspectives (climate change, pollution, habitat and nature protection) and the
social consequences of environmental degradation. However, the hard obligations that
were anticipated to mirror and build upon the exhortations in Agenda 21 did not
necessarily follow. There are very few protocols building on the CBD’s framework
provisions, for instance.24 In particular, issues such as the protection of forests are
politically too sensitive for states to reach a much needed agreement that would be
legally binding.25 Instead, proposed terms were embedded in a soft law instrument
which, in its title – ‘Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a
Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development
of All Types of Forests’ – emphasizes the neurotic fear of nations to assume responsibility
in this area of concern.26
Moreover, the instruments deriving from the Rio Earth Summit lack the support
of a meta-governance structure with a coordinating function similar to that of the
WTO in the context of the multilateral trade regime.
The Rio Earth Summit generated two legally binding instruments by the CBD and
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).27 Both
instruments cover very broadly framed environmental challenges. Yet, at their inception,
it was contemplated that they would be complemented by subsidiary instruments
(protocols) creating comprehensive bespoke subsets of obligations.28 From the
perspective of biodiversity conservation, this process has not taken place in a com-
prehensive manner. The scope of the CBD remains extensive (its objects as described
22 Available at: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/environment/ecological-sciences/man-and-
biosphere-programme/about-mab.
23 Ofﬁcially called the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de
Janeiro (Brazil), 3–14 June 1992.
24 See Harrop & Pritchard, n. 10, above.
25 See, e.g., the Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the
Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 62/98 (17 Dec. 2007). See, in particular, F. McConnell, The
Biodiversity Convention: A Negotiating History (Kluwer Law International, 1996).
26 See Harrop & Pritchard, n. 10 above.
27 New York, NY (US), 9 May 1992, in force 24 Mar. 1994, available at: http://unfccc.int.
28 S. Bragdon, ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity’ (1999) 6(2) Global Environmental Change,
pp. 177–9.
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in Article 1 comprise ‘the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of
its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the beneﬁts arising out of the
utilization of genetic resources’) but the Convention is not supported by appropriate
protocols.29 Furthermore, the text of the CBD, despite its attempt at umbrella
coverage of conservation issues, does not expressly link to any other contemporary
conservation treaties. Even when the opportunity arose, the CBD 2010 targets made
no attempt to expressly make a reference to or parallels with CITES. This was despite
the fact that international trade in endangered species was speciﬁcally referred to in those
non-binding targets.
Given the links between species, ecosystems, and wider global life-support systems
expressly acknowledged in the text of the soft and hard instruments that were
adopted at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, an opportunity has been lost at the foundational
stage to create leadership in the diverse strands of law and policy that had evolved
erratically and independently to deal with limited aspects of an overall complex
challenge. Firstly, without that endowment of express power from the creation of
the CBD, it will be more difﬁcult politically, in a world where short-term national
government agendas can so easily frustrate essential long-term global sustainability
strategies, to give the CBD a position of leadership in the ﬁeld of conservation law.
Secondly, in legal terms any attempt to have other instruments fulﬁl the CBD’s
overall strategy may be susceptible to arguments that such assumption of control
would be ultra vires the Convention. Therefore, if the CBD is not amended, these
obstacles may permanently block any leadership and coordination role of the CBD.
In any event, attempts at granting leadership to the CBD can only be informal and
aspirational. This is evidenced in the CBD’s strategic target programme.
In recent years the CBD has concentrated its regulatory efforts on creating
non-binding targets. The ﬁrst set of these targets30 was designed to be achieved in
2010. They failed in their aspirations,31 and have also been heavily criticized for
their technically ill-conceived approach and for their lack of indicators.32 The
CBD’s Strategic Plan was drastically revised in Nagoya (Japan) at the end of
2010,33 in response to the disappointing performance of the previous strategy.
New, more sophisticated targets (known as the ‘Aichi Biodiversity Targets’) were
set out in the Annex to cover the various issues that can be included within the
29 Though note the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal
(Canada), 29 Jan. 2000, in force 11 Sept. 2003, available at: http://bch.cbd.int/protocol; and theNagoya
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Beneﬁts Arising from
their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya (Japan), 29 Oct. 2010, in force
12 Oct. 2014, available at: http://www.cbd.int/abs.
30 CBD COP Decision VI/26 of 2002, ‘Strategic Plan for the Convention on Biological Diversity: 2010
Targets’, available at: http://www.cbd.int/2010-target/about.shtml.
31 Harrop, n. 6 above.
32 Among others, see J. Carwardine et al., ‘Hitting the Target and Missing the Point: Target-based
Conservation Planning in Context’ (2009) 2 Conservation Letters, pp. 3–10; and for a general
assessment and synthesis of the criticisms see Harrop & Pritchard, n. 10 above.
33 CBDCOPDecisionX/2X/2 of 2011, ‘Strategic Plan for Biodiversity for the Period 2011–2020’, annexed
to CBDCOP10Agenda Item 4.2, ‘Updating andRevision of the Strategic Plan for the Post-2010 Period’,
available at: http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id512268.
316 Transnational Environmental Law, 3:2 (2014), pp. 311–320
CBD’s wide-ranging objectives. The emphasis is, of course, on biological diversity
and its protection and maintenance in all its facets, but other related subjects are
also dealt with. For instance, Target 2 seeks to integrate ‘biodiversity values’ into
national and local development and poverty reduction strategies; Target 7 seeks
to ‘manage sustainably areas under agriculture, aquaculture and forestry, ensuring
conservation of biodiversity’; Target 13 seeks to ‘maintain and prevent the..erosion of
the genetic diversity of cultivated plants and farmed and domesticated animals and of
wild relatives’, and Target 14 seeks to ‘restore and safeguard ecosystems that provide
essential services, including services related to water, and contribute to health,
livelihoods and well-being . taking into account the needs of women, indigenous
and local communities, and the poor and vulnerable’. The CBD thereby creates links
with the wider developmental agenda by taking into account developmental issues
such as food supply, safety and security, poverty reduction and many other issues.
Moreover, through its administration of such a wide range of subjects, the CBD acts
as an overseer of many of the issues which must be dealt with in a holistic approach
to the conservation of nature in the context of international development agendas.
This role may not amount to formal leadership but the targets implicitly acknowledge
that the response to the challenges of our age require a holistic approach. This hints
at a glimmer of appreciation among the international community of the need for
leadership in the area of conservation.
3. leadership in conservation
The recent emphasis on non-binding targets has led commentators to argue that the
CBD is devolving from a hard law instrument to an instrument with a soft effect.34
Indeed, because of their non-binding approach, the language of the targets is more akin
to expressions of aspiration, exhortation, inspiration and vision. Such texture in
language is not appropriate in legal instruments since it lacks the precision required to
establish legal norms that can be consistently implemented, especially given the variety
of languages and legal cultures within the international community. While the language
used in the targets may not build consistent and lasting norms, its inspirational tone
ironically may make the targets more effective as instruments to exhort and inspire
leaders to rally together the disparate functions. Indeed, the new CBD Strategic Plan
expressly recognizes a potential leadership role for the CBD among the scattered
portfolio of international instruments that deal with nature conservation and among
international parties and stakeholders involved with the issue. In its ﬁrst paragraph,
the new Strategic Plan expressly seeks to ‘promote effective implementation of the
Convention through a strategic approach comprising a shared vision, a mission,
strategic goals and targets that will inspire broad-based action by all Parties and
stakeholders’35 and section 17 of the Annex to the Plan seeks to promote partnerships
34 Harrop & Pritchard, n. 10 above. See also A. Kotsakis, ‘Change and Subjectivity in International
Environmental Law: TheMicro-Politics of the Transformation of Biodiversity intoGenetic Gold’ (2014)
3(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 127–47, at 146.
35 CBD COP Decision X/2X/2 of 2011, n. 33 above, Annex, para 1.
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with related conventions. This speciﬁcally reinforces provisions in the parent text of the
Strategic Plan which state that the plan ‘represents a useful ﬂexible framework that is
relevant to all biodiversity-related conventions’.36 Further, paragraph 17(c) of the
principal text acknowledges the need to create a ‘coherent implementation of
biodiversity-related conventions and agreements’.37
Two necessary components of leadership are required in this context: the one
already described in principle within the Strategic Plan is the need to corral the diverse
instruments and parties involved in the process of nature conservation. The second
component is the need to oversee national implementation; this need is implicit in the
CBD which establishes a Clearing House Mechanism (Article 18(3)) to coordinate and
communicate national actions, plans and strategies.
But are the preliminary trappings of leadership endowed upon the CBD sufﬁcient to
provide a strong and sustainable facility to face the present and future environmental
and developmental challenges? Further, is the CBD an appropriate body to lead on
such a wide range of issues that cut across many entrenched portfolios?
Farnese, in the context of her focus on the need for an effective international
response mechanism to deal with emerging zoonotic diseases, points out that no single
international organization with an explicit mandate for wildlife health protection exists.
Therefore various international agencies with mixed portfolios respond in a scattered,
ﬁre-ﬁghting manner and ‘states are rarely directed by international governance
mechanisms to address meaningfully the root causes’.38 She goes on to indicate that
this state of affairs ‘mirrors what is seen in other areas of wildlife management at the
international level’.39 Perhaps the CBD’s non-binding and rather ﬂexible targets are
an attempt to deal with this type of criticism but, as has been pointed out, the latest
targets replicate many shortcomings of the previous failed targets. In addition, they
provide outmoded responses and insufﬁciently ﬂexible answers to deal with the
challenges that face us. Farnese, referring to the thinking of Simon,40 argues in the
context of the complexity of emerging zoonotic diseases, that there is a need for
a rapid and innovative response and thus the need for a ‘rolling regulatory regime
characterized by collective and interdisciplinary decision making that balances both
formal rules and informal standards’41 rather than a ﬁxed regime based on relatively
inﬂexible mandates. Such a regime would have the ability to link all the issues that
relate to challenges along with the international agencies and conventions that deal
with them.
But is this idea just relevant to the emergence of diseases linked to wildlife vectors
or can it be extrapolated to the need to embrace a holistic and integrated strategy to
deal with complexity in the environmental challenges that face us? The issues of
36 Ibid., Preamble.
37 Ibid.
38 Farnese, n. 1 above, at p. 289.
39 Ibid.
40 W. Simon, ‘Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory andRollingRule Regimes’, Columbia Law School, Public
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper 04-79, at p. 4. available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract5602626.
41 Farnese, n. 1 above, at pp. 304–5.
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biodiversity degradation, disease prevention and nature protection, food security and
food safety are all complex issues that require a coordinated strategy deploying a
combination of steady-state and ﬂexible responses that can surmount the politics that
arrests the progress of many standard multilateral initiatives in the ﬁeld of environmental
law. The CBD’s attempt at exhortation and leadership comprised in its new Strategic Plan
aspires to ﬁnd away to achieve this. The targets seek to provide planning for the future and
milestones that need to be reached. They may be ill-advised in many cases and hampered
by the lack of binding commitments but they are relatively holistic in nature.Whatmay be
needed is a non-political body to feed into the process, to establish priorities that are
robustly constructed and reﬂect best knowledge and science. It may be that an overarching
lead institution can then allocate roles to the existing agencies and conventions (it would
be an unrealistic task to design all from scratch again) and monitor and encourage
(or preferably require) compliance of state parties.
Farnese suggests using the new Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and
Ecosystem Services (IPBES) whose role is to ‘assess the state of the planet’s biodiversity,
its ecosystems and the essential services they provide to society’.42 Whereas I can
appreciate the importance of the new platform, the IPBES mandate dictates that it
must remain an authoritative advisory body free from management constraints and
politics. It should be able to report objectively and fearlessly to an overall leadership
body whose task might, by example, mirror that of the WTO in respect of the
multilateral trade agreements. What is needed is an institution that could take on
board the recommendations of the IPBES and oversee the implementation, administration
and operation of all soft and hard law instruments regarding natural resources
conservation and related issues.
4. conclusion
In sum, it may be that much is already in place except for the pinnacle body which is
endowed with power and responsibility to bring together legal instruments and the
variety of stakeholders in the ﬁeld of conservation law. Such a body could take a leaf
from the texts that created the WTO and apply the approach used to further the
multilateral trade regime to environmental law. If this were to be done we might
begin with the creation of an overarching body (a ‘World Environment Organization’)
that would link together the disparate but related issues that stem from the challenges
we face as a combined result of environmental degradation and unfettered global,
developmental aspirations.43 Such an organization would have the following prime
mandates:44
42 See http://www.ipbes.net/about-ipbes.html.
43 In this context see S. Charnovitz, ‘AWorld Environment Organization’ (2002) 27 Columbia Journal of
Environmental Law, pp. 323–62.
44 These suggestions derive from Article III of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Marrakesh (Morocco), 15 Apr. 1994, in force 1 Jan. 1995, available at:
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm. See also ibid.
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1. To facilitate the implementation, administration and operation, and further the
objectives, of [list of all current, relevant agreements, soft instruments, hard
conventions etc. in an Annex].
2. To administer global environment and development policies, taking into account
the advice of [IPBES].
The umbrella organization could bring coherence within the ﬁeld of conservation law
and contribute to setting up coordinated responses to conservation and related issues.
It would be in a position to apply its helicopter vision, duly counselled by an advisory
body, to determine which elements of its wide-ranging toolkit of governance
responses are appropriate in each case without being restricted by the fossilized remit
of one particular instrument. It would also be in a strong position to advocate for
change to expand its range of responses and to act decisively. Beyond this, clear and
empowered leadership could direct relevant bodies to prioritize and, thus, make them
more cost-effective and efﬁcient. This would leave institutions better equipped to face
the challenges of biodiversity decline in the context of development and social
pressures. Many scientists already appreciate that perfect solutions to species loss and
habitat degradation do not exist. This makes reliance on currently available strategic
and pragmatic approaches to prioritization essential.45 Such propositions, helped
with proper coordination and leadership, could inform and direct the joint efforts of all
instruments under a single umbrella and enhance their effectiveness far beyond existing
levels.46 Moreover, leadership that emanates from a body with a wider vision – that
takes into account social, developmental, climate, food security and wider global
challenges – could ensure that other related issues (including issues under CITES, the
IWC or the World Heritage Convention) form part of the international agenda. Such
leadership could result in a much stronger and clearly prioritized approach to
responding to the extensive and urgent conservation challenges that face us.
45 See, e.g., N. Myers, R.A.Mittermeier, C.G.Mittermeier, G. Da Fonseca& J. Kent, ‘Biodiversity Hotspots
for Conservation Priorities’ (2000) 403(6772) Nature, pp. 853–58; N. Robin et al., ‘Global Mapping of
Ecosystem Services and Conservation Priorities’ (2008) 105(28) Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, pp. 9495–500; J. Carwardine et al., ‘Cost-effective Priorities for Global Mammal Conservation’
(2008) 105(32) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, pp. 11446–50.
46 See, e.g., the propositions suggested for a better coordination of European marine conservation in
K. Metcalfe, T. Roberts, R.J. Smith & S.R. Harrop, ‘Marine Conservation Science and Governance in
North-West Europe: Conservation Planning and International Law and ¨Policy’ (2013) 39 Marine
Policy, pp. 289–95.
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